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Roman Sources and Constitutional Mandates: The Alpha
and Omega of Louisiana Laws on Concubinage and Natural
Children
Kathryn Venturatos Lorio"
The Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 contained many laws regulating the
extramarital family composed of a concubine and her natural children-the
"other" family. In addition to an elaborate hierarchy of classification of
illegitimate children, the Code of 1870 contained restrictions regulating donations
between certain unmarried cohabitants and further limitations applying to gifts
from such individuals to their children. The Roman sources of those laws and
the ultimate fate of the Code articles due to constitutional challenges and social
realities are the subject of this article.In classical Rome, the concubina was different from a mere meretrix.' She
was not just any mistress, but a special one.' The relationship between a man
and his concubina was somewhere between a casual affair and a marriage.'
During the republican period, a man could have both a wife and a concubine.'
There was no apparent stigma attached to the relationship which had purely
social recognition in classical time.5 Likewise, there were no restrictions on
men bestowing gifts on their concubines.'
Concubinage became more common, gaining the status of a recognized
institution, during Augustus's time, when restrictive Augustan legislation, Lex
Julia et Papia Pappaea, disqualified many persons from marrying each other.
For example, senators and their descendants for three generations were banned
from marrying certain categories of people such as freedmen and freedwomen,
actors and actresses and their children, prostitutes, procurers, procuresses and
their ex-slaves, convicted adulterers, and persons convicted in public
prosecutions. Except for freed persons, all of these were considered probrosi,
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1. Fritz Schulz, Classical Roman Law 137 (1951).
2. Alan Watson, The Law of Persons in the Later Roman Republic 2 (1967). Professor
Watson points out that in the play Miles Gloriosus, Plautus uses the term concubina to describe
Pyrogopolynices and her relationship to Philocomasuum. Id. Plautus consistently uses the term
concubina and only twice refers to her as amica, which makes sense if a special sort of mistress was
being described. Id.
3. Osborne M. Reynolds, Jr., Legal and Social Aspects of Roman Marriage, 9 S.U. L. Rev.,
205, 212 (1983).
4. Schulz, supra note 1, at 138.
5. Id.
6. Andrew Borkowski, Textbook on Roman Law 123 (1994). See also William W. Buckland,
A Textbook of Roman Law from Augustus to Justinian 128 (2d ed. 1932).
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morally reprehensible.7, Soldiers were forbidden to be married during the time
of service If marriages preceded entry into the service, the marriages were
dissolved on entry.9 A freedman was barred from marrying his patroness, or the
widow or daughter of his patron.'0 Tutors could not marry their wards," and
provincials could not marry women of their provinces.' An exception was
made for the latter if the province was his home province. 3
Although concubinage was not expressly mentioned in the Augustan laws
on matrimony," which were motivated to reform public morals, concubinage
as an institution became a by-product of it." People who wanted to establish
a stable union, but were denied the legal opportunity to marry because they
lacked the legal capacity or conubium,"6 often established themselves in a
concubinage relationship. Knowing they could not legally marry, they lacked the
"animus" or intention to legally marry. '7 If not forbidden by nature to marry
because of consanguinity,' 8 age limitation, or inability to consent, 9 but only
prohibited by the ins civile to marry, people often entered into concubinage
relationships.20 Concubinage thus became a sort of shadow marriage, a union of
lesser stature than marriage, especially for the woman in the relationship, 2' who
was somewhere "below the honours of a wife, [yet] above the infamy of a
prostitute. '2  In many other respects, concubinage so resembled marriage that
the only way to clearly distinguish the two was that a dowry or dos offered the
best evidence that the parties intended a marriage and not merely concubinage.'
Sometimes the position of concubine was actually preferred by the woman,
7. Jane F. Gardner, Women in Roman Law and Society 32 (1986).
8. Id. at 33.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. See also Buckland, supra note 6, at 128.
12. Gardner, supra note 7, at 33.
13. Id. See also Dig. 25.7.5 (Paul, Views 2).
14. Pal Csillag, The Augustan Laws on Family Relations 144 (1976).
15. Gardner, supra note 7, at 145. See generally Beryl Rawson, Roman Concubinage andOther De Facto Marriages, 104 Transactions of the Am. Philological Ass'n 279 (Douglas E. Gerber
ed., 1974).
16. Gardner, supra note 7, at 31.
17. Ferdinand Mackeldey, Handbook of the Roman Law 410 (Moses A. Dropsie ed. & trans.,
1883). The author notes in more specific terms that concubines and their paramours lacked animus
matrimonnii. Id.
18. Buckland, supra note 6, at 128.
19. Id. (citing Dig. 25.7.1.4). This portion of the Digest explains that "[i]t is clear that anyone
can keep a concubine of any age unless [the concubine] is less than twelve years old." Dig. 25.7.1.4
(Ulpian, Lex Julia et Papia 2).
20. W. A. Hunter, A Systematic and Historical Exposition of Roman Law In the Order of a
Code 694 (J. Ashton Cross trans., 4th ed. 1992).
21. Charles P. Sherman, Roman Law in the Modem World 73 (1922).
22. The Roman Law Reader 31 (F.H. Lawson ed. 1969).
23. Gardner, supra note 7, at 56. See also Watson, supra note 2, at 6.
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whose property was protected from loss as a dowry." This was often the case
when a patron, or patronus, established a stable relationship with his
freedwoman, or llberta.2" Because people of equal rank were permitted to
marry, the usual participants in concubinage were a man of higher status and a
woman of lower status.26 Although the union did not elevate the woman to the
man's rank,27 she supposedly obtained a sort of security and a higher standard
of living than she would otherwise enjoy. The man, on the other hand, was
afforded more options in selecting partners" and could establish a stable
relationship with a partner who would have no legal claim to his property and
was not expected to bear him children. If she did bear him children, the children
would be illegitimate, having no legal claim to his property.2
In an effort to ensure that Roman women stayed pure and eligible for
marriage, Augustan legislation discouraged stuprum, the sexual union outside
marriage between free persons. Special courts were established to deal with
offenders.3" The laws on stuprum did not apply to prostitutes; likewise,
prosecution was often avoided in instances of concubinage when the concubine
was of a lower status than the man and, thus, not a potential marital partner.3'
.Although it was unclear which of the Augustan laws applied to concubinage,
it was understood that the Lex Julia et Papia Pappaea permitted the practice, and
the participants were not guilty of adultery,32 thus relieving the parties from the
penalties associated with stuprum, as long as their union did not violate
principles of monogamy, incest or puberty.33 Thus, in the post-classical period,
concubinage became a monogamous arrangement, 34 in contrast to the practice
during the time of Cicero when a man could have both a wife and a
concubine, 3 or for that matter, two concubines at the same time.36 Certainly,
during the Empire, it was clear that a man could not have both a wife and a
24. Hunter, supra note 20, at 695.
25. Id. at 694-95.
26. Borkowski, supra note 6, at 123. See also Rawson, supra note 15, at 288; Buckland, supra
note 6, at 128; Watson, supra note 2, at 7; Dig. 25.7.3 (Marcian, Institutes 12). But see John Crook,
Law and Life of Rome 102 (1967) (explaining that a striking feature of the institution of concubinage
was the relationship between women of high status and men of a humbler rank).
27. Sherman, supra note 21, at 73.
28. Susan Treggiari, Roman Marriage: lusti Coniuges from the Time of Cicero to the Time
of Ulpian 52 (1991). The author points out that men often had women of a lower social status as
their concubines before entering a legal marriage or after a wife died. Id.
29. Id.
30. Borkowski, supra note 6, at 123.
31. Treggiari, supra note 28, at 311. See also Dig. 25.7.1.1 (Ulpian, Lex Julia et Papia 2).
32. Csillag, supra note 14, at 146.
33. Joseph DeClareuil, Rome the Law-Giver 113 (1927). See also William W. Buckland, A
Manual of Roman Private Law 79 (2d ed. 1981).
34. Crook, supra note 26, at 102.
35. Watson, supra note 2, at 9. See also Code J. 5.26.1.
36. Lord Mackenzie, Studies in Roman Law With Comparative Views of the Law of France,
England, And Scotland 99 (3d ed. 1870).
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concubine at the same time.37  For then, the participants would be guilty of
stuprum.
38
Children of these relationships were considered illegitimate39 and belonged
only to the mother.' When the principle of cognation developed, these children
were able to claim succession rights through their mothers.4 These children,
however, were legally fatherless.4" The only way a father of such children
could get potestas43 over the children would be by adopting them
(adrogatio)."
• Major changes in the legal treatment of the "other" family occurred during
the period of the Christian Emperor Constantine the Great. Not favoring
concubinage, but wishing to encourage marriage, Constantine in his Edict of
A.D. 335, introduced the possibility of legitimation of illegitimate children by the
subsequent marriage of their parents.4s The reform, meant to promote marriage,
was not generally available but was limited to those persons who were already
living in a stable relationship of concubinage. 4  In addition, Constantine
imposed an incapacity on concubines and their natural children to take any
property from the father. 47  This rule was mitigated by the Constitutions of
Valentiniam, Valens, and Gratian in A. D. 371 which limited gifts to natural
children to one-twelfth if a man died leaving legitimate children or grandchildren,
or a father or mother.48 If no such relations survived, the man could leave to
his concubine or children up to one-fourth of this property.49 In 476 A.D.,
Zeno abrogated the law of Constantine as to legitimation by marriage, except for
freeborn concubines who already had children." However, Justinian in A.D.
529 revived and expanded the policies of Constantine. Legitimation by
37. Hunter, supra note 20, at 694. See also Buckland, supra note 6, at 121.
38. Mackenzie, supra note 36, at 99.
39. Borkowski, supra note 6, at 123.
40. 1 Henry J. Roby, Roman Private Law in the Times of Cicero and of the Antonines 169
(1902).
41. A.C. Jacobs, Illegitimacy, Legal Aspects, 7 Encyclopedia of Social Sciences 582, 582
(Edwin A. Seligman & Alvin Johnson eds., 1932).
42. Mackeldey, supra note 17, at 444.
43. Being under the potestas of the father, in addition to giving the child a right to inherit from
the father, also gave the father significant control over the child. For example, the father had the
power to put his child to death for just cause, sell the child into slavery, sanction the child's marriage
of the child, and force the child to divorce. Alan Watson, The Spirit of Roman Law I I (1995).
44. Although during this classical period, it was not possible to adopt female children in this
way, later, both males and females could be adrogated by imperial rescript. Gardner, supra note 7,
at 144.
45. Buckland, supra note 33, at 79.
46. Id.
47. Hunter, supra note 20, at 321-22. See also DeClareuil, supra note 33, at 335.
48. Hunter, supra note 20, at 322 (citing Code Th. 4.6.1).
49. Code Th. 4.6.1. These provisions correspond to the later Constitution of Arcadius and
Honorius in A.D. 403. See also Code J. 5.27.2 as noted in Hunter, supra note 20, at 322.
50. Hunter, supra note 20, at 201. See also Sherman, supra note 21, at 81.
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subsequent marriage of the parents was permitted even if the father already had
legitimate children5' although the possibility of such a legitimation was still
restricted to liberi naturales, or natural children who were the children of
concubines, as opposed to spurii or vulgo concepti, who were children born of
more casual affairs, and legitimation was definitely not available to adulterini or
incestuosi, the children born of adultery or incest.' Legitimation by subsequent
marriage of the parents was later established in the Canon Law by two
Constitutions of Pope Alexander III and was preserved in the decretals of
Gregory.53 :The Canon law extended the possibility of legitimation to children
born of fornication if the father and mother were capable of contracting marriage
at the time of the sexual intercourse.' Legitimation by later marriage in
Justinian's time required an instrumenta dotalia, or document regulating marriage
settlement accompanied by proof that the concubinage was transformed into a
marriage. Also, the partners needed to demonstrate that they were free to marry
at the time of conception and, if possible, that the children consented to the
legitimation. The latter was desirable since the result of the process would
render the children subject to the potestas of the father. s" As with any other
marriage, the dowry served as best evidence of the marriage.' 6
Justinian also introduced the concept of legitimation by imperial rescripte'
or per rescriptum principis.se In instances in which a marriage was impossible
such as where the concubine had either died or was unfit to marry, a man could
petition the emperor or enter a request in his will for a rescript legitimizing the
children he had with his concubine.' 9 This could only be done if the father had
no legitimate issue and, if possible, the assent of the children was obtained.'
A third method of legitimation, legitimation oblatio curiae, was also
introduced in the late Empire.6 ' First established by Theodosius II in A.D.
443,62 the process allowed a liberi naturale or natural child to become legitimate
by enrollment as a member of the curia or municipal council,63 a local
administrative body which attracted few recruits due to the many burdens
associated with the position." By this process, a son could be legitimated by
51. Sherman, supra 21. at 81. See also Code J. 5.27.5; Const. of J., Nov. 89.8.
52. For classifications of illegitimate children, see Ph. J. Thomas, Introduction to Roman Law
138 (1986).
53. Mackenzie, supra note 36, at 126.
54. Id. at 127. See also Reynolds, supra note 3, at 212.
55. Thomas, supra note 52, at 138.
56. See Watson, supra note 2, at 6.
57. Borkowski, supra note 6, at 109. See also Const. of J., Nov. 89.9.
58. Mackenzie, supra note 36, at 127.
59. Sherman, supra note 21, at 82.
60. Thomas, supra note 52, at 138.
61. Borkowski, supra note 6, at 109.
62. Mackenzie, supra note 36, at 127.
63. Thomas, supra note 52, at 138.
64. Buckland, supra note 33, at 80.
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becoming a decurio or a daughter, by marrying a decurio. Although the
procedure, which was extended by Justinian even to fathers with legitimate
children,6" created potestas, the process was not sufficient to create agnation
with the father's relatives."
In addition to recognizing these possible ways to legitimate illegitimate
children, Justinian's legislation expanded rights of those illegitimate children who
were the products of a concubinage relationship. Thus, these "natural children"
were given the right to claim support from their fathers.67 Also, Justinian
expanded the rights of these children to receive gifts from their father. When the
father also had legitimate children, the share permitted to be given to the natural
children remained at one-twelfth as it had been previously." However, if there
were no legitimate children, but only ascendants of the father, the ascendants
received the legitima portio, and the natural children and concubine were
permitted to receive the rest. Without ascendants, the father could leave all of
his property to his concubine and natural children.69 These liberalities were not
bestowed on other illegitimates such as those of an incestuous union, who were
not even recognized as being due support from their mothers.70
Concubinage was thus tolerated even by the Christian emperors and was not
abolished until 887 A.D. when Emperor Leo the Wise eliminated the legal
recognition of concubinage,7' as well as the distinctions between "natural
children" and all other illegitimates." Yet, despite Leo's edict, the practice of
concubinage survived in Western Europe, was practiced by the Teutonic people,
and was recognized in the Middle Ages."
Concubinage as an institution is still recognized in Louisiana, although it has
undergone many social and legal changes over the years. References to
concubinage appear in all the Louisiana Codes. Similar to the Roman concept, it
"describes a status, and not mere acts of fornication or adultery, however frequent
or even habitual." 4 Quoting with approval from The Grand Dictionnaire of
Larousse, the Louisiana Supreme Court noted, "We must not confound the
concubine with the courtesan, or even with what is ordinarily called a mistress. The
concubine is an entirely different thing. It is the wife without the title; it is marriage
without the sanction of the law."" It differs from common law marriage, because,
as the Romans would say, the parties lacked animus matrimonii. They have not
65. Id.
66. Id. See also Const. of J., Nov. 89.4; In. 1.10.13; Code J. 5.27.9.
67. Mackeldey, supra note 17, at 445 n.1 (citing Const. of J., Nov. 89).
68. Hunter, supra note 20, at 802. See also Const. of J., Nov. 89.12.2.
69. Hunter, supra note 20, at 802. See also Const. of J., Nov. 89.12.3.
70. Mackeldey, supra note 17, at 445 n.I. See also Const. of J., Nov. 89.15.
71. Consts. of the Emperor Leo, 91.
72. William L. Burdick, The Principles of Roman Law and Their Relation to Modem Law 232
(1938).
73. Sherman, supra note 21, at 73-74.
74. Succession of Jahraus, 114 La. 456, 458, 38 So. 417, 418 (La. 1905).
75. Jahraus, 114 La. at 459, 38 So. at 418.
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consented, either formally or informally, to marriage.7" In a concubinage
relationship, neither party has any notion of being married to the other. Thus, it
differs from a putative marriage in which at least one of the parties is in good faith,
believing that he or she is married to the other."
The ramifications of the two concepts also differ since the putative spouse7
is afforded civil effects of marriage, whereas legal rights and duties do not flow to
the concubine.
Concubinage in Louisiana, however, differs from the concubinage in the
Roman empire. For, in Louisiana, it is not necessarily a monogamous relationship.
Although the Civil Code of 1825 afforded a wife the right to claim a separation on
the grounds of adultery if the husband kept his concubine in the common family
dwelling,79 it was possible for a man to have a legal wife in one residence and a
concubine in another. Also, when divorce was a much more difficult process than
it is today, people who were unable to divorce often established new relationships
in concubinage in the interim. Thus, technically, these individuals had both a legal
spouse and a partner in concubinage at the same time.
Like the Romans, Louisianians often entered into concubinage because the
Louisiana civil law prohibited some partners from legally marrying. Concubinage
76. In fact, until 1975, common law marriage was a criminal offense in Louisiana, punishable
by a fine of up to one thousand dollars or imprisonment with or without hard labor for not more than
one year or both. La. R.S. 14:79.1, enacted by 1960 La. Acts No. 73, § 1, repealed by 1975 La. Acts
No. 638, § 3. Before it was repealed, section 14:79.1 provided:
Entering into a common law marriage as herein defined is hereby declared to be a crime.
For the purposes of this section a common law marriage is an agreement, either written,
oral, or tacitly entered into, between a man and a woman to then and there become
husband and wife, without a ceremonial marriage solemnized pursuant to a license
obtained in accordance with the laws of this state, followed by cohabitation. The living
together openly by a man and a woman as man and wife shall be considered as prima
facie evidence that a common law marriage has been entered into by them.
Whoever commits the crime of entering into a common law marriage with another shall
be fined not more than one thousand dollars, or imprisoned, with or without hard labor,
for not more than one year, or both.
Id.
77. La. Civ. Code art. 96:
An absolutely null marriage nevertheless produces civil effects in favor of a party who
contracted it in good faith for as long as that party remains in good faith.
When the cause of the nullity is one party's prior undissolved marriage, the civil effects
continue in favor of the other party, regardless of whether the latter remains in good faith,
until the marriage is pronounced null or the latter party contracts a valid marriage.
A marriage contracted by a party in good faith produces civil effects in favor of a child
of the parties.
A purported marriage between parties of the same sex does not produce any civil effects.
Id.
78. See Texada v. Spence, 166 La. 1020, 118 So. 120 (1928).
79. La. Civ. Code art. 137 (1825). Article 137 of the Code of 1825 corresponds to La. Civ.
Code art. 3 (1808). See Robert Pascal, Louisiana Family Law Course 579 (Katherine S. Spaht ed.,
1986), in which Professors Pascal and Spaht point to this article as evidence of the "widespread
acceptance of concubinage as a social phenomenon."
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was, for example, a viable alternative to interracial couples who, until 1972, were
prohibited by the Civil Code from marrying.0 Also, a person who was divorced
from his spouse on the grounds of having committed adultery was forbidden by the
Code to marry his or her accomplice in adultery.8' Again, concubinage was a
possible alternative.
The Civil Code of 1870 in Article 209, as did its predecessor Code in 18 2 5 8'
and the Digest of 1808,83 recognized, as proof acceptable in the proving of
paternal descent, the fact that a mother was known to be living in a state of
concubinage with a man at the time of a child's conception. Although current
Article 209, which addresses methods of proof of filiation, does not mention
concubinage, the comments following the article list as possible evidence of
filiation, "proof that the alleged parents lived in a state of concubinage at the time
of conception.""
80. La. R.S. 9:201, repealed by 1975 Acts No. 638, § 3. Before it was repealed in 1975,
section 9:201 provided that "[m]arriage between persons of the Indian race and persons of the colored
and black race is prohibited, and the celebration of all such marriages is forbidden and such
celebration carries with it no effect, and is null and void." Id.
Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 87 S. Ct.
1817 (1967), declaring antimiscegenation statutes unconstitutional on the basis of the equal protection
and due process clauses of the United States Constitution, Louisiana repealed this law. 1975 La. Acts
No. 638, § 3.
81. La. Civ. Code art. 161 (1870), repealed by 1972 La. Acts No. 625, § 1. Article 161
provided that "[i]n case of divorce, on account of adultery, the guilty party can never contract
matrimony with his or her accomplice in adultery, under the penalty of being considered and
prosecuted as guilty of the crime of bigamy, and under the penalty of nullity of the new marriage."
Id.
82. La. Civ. Code art. 227 (1825). Article 227 of the Code of 1825 provided:
In the case where the proof of natural paternal descent is authorized by the preceding
article, the proof may be made in either of the following ways:
I. By all kinds of private writings, in which the father may have acknowledged the
bastard as his child, or may have called him so;
2. When the father, either in public or in private, has acknowledged him as his child, or
has called him so in conversation, or has caused him to be educated as such;
3. When the mother of the child was known as living in a state of concubinage with the
father, and resided as such in his house at the time when the child was conceived.
Id.
83. La. Civ. Code art. 31 (1808). Article 31 of the Code of 1808 provided:
In the case where the proof of natural paternal descent is authorised [sic], under and by
the preceding article, this proof may be made in either of the following ways:
1. By all kinds of private writings in which the father may have acknowledged the
bastard as his child, or may have called him so.
2. When the father, either in public or in private, has acknowledged him as his child, or
has called him so in conversation, or has caused him to be educated as such.
3. When the mother of the child was known as living in a state of concubinage with the
father, and resided as such in his house at the time when the child was conceived.
Id.
84. La. Civ. Code art. 209 cmt. b: "Proof of filiation may include, but is not limited u:
'Informal' acknowledgment; scientific test results; acknowledgment in a testament; and proof that the
alleged parents lived in a state of concubinage at the time of conception." Id.
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The most litigated article of the Civil Code or 1870 which dealt with
concubinage was by far Article 1481 which limited donations between persons who
lived in concubinage. The article incapacitated those who had lived together in
open concubinage from making to each other any donations of immovables,
whether by donation inter vivos or mortis causa. Donations of movables could not
exceed one-tenth of the whole value of the donor's estate. In an effort to encourage
marriage, the article provided that those who later married were exempt from this
restriction.85 The article may be traced back to French sources which prohibited
all donations between concubines.'6 Apparently this prohibition resulted in
numerous unsavory law suits which generated rumors, uncovered secret liaisons,
and were generally regarded as distasteful. Consequently, the Projet of the Code
Napoleon qualified the prohibition on such donations by only incapacitating those
who were notorious about their living arrangement. 7 After much debate, and
fearful of promoting the negative type of inquiry which had previously found its
way to the courts, the framers of the Code Napoleon completely omitted from their
code any restriction on gift-giving by those living in concubinage. Louisiana,
however, incorporated a restriction, but limited its applicability. Article 10 of the
Digest of 1808 only disqualified those who had lived in "open" concubinage and
the restriction applied to any universal donation or donation by universal title. It
was the Civil Code of 1825 which, while retaining the limitation as to only "open"
concubinage, further restricted the disqualification to any immovables and to
movables only to the extent of one-tenth of the donor's whole estate. Additionally,
it was at the time of the Civil Code of 1825 that the exemption for those who later
marry was introduced."8
Much of the litigation involving this article dealt with the issue of whether or
not the concubinage was indeed "open." Concealment of the relationship made the
85. La. Civ. Code art. 1481 (1870), repealed by 1987 La. Acts No. 468, § I. Before it was
repealed, Article 1481 provided:
Those who have lived together in open concubinage are respectively incapable of making
to each other, whether inter vivos or mortis causa, any donation of immovables; and if
they make a donation of movables, it can not exceed one-tenth part of the whole value
of their estate.
Those who afterwards marry are excepted from this rule.
Id.
86. The concept that "[d]on de concubin A concubine ne vaut" was affirmed by the Royal
Ordinance of 1629, article 132, which nullified any such attempt to donate. See Succession of
Jahraus, 114 La. 456, 38 So. 417, 419 (1905).87. "Ce qui ont vecu ensemble dans un concubinage notoire sont respectivement incapables de
se donner." Projet du Gouvernement, Book I1, Title IX, art. 11 (1808).
88. La. Civ. Code art. 1468 (1825). Article 1468 of the Code of 1825 provided:
Those who have lived together in open concubinage are respectively incapable of making
to each other, whether inter vivos or mortds causa, any donation of immovables; and if
they make a donation of movables, it can not exceed one-tenth part of the whole value
of their estate.
Those who afterwards marry, are excepted from this rule.
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article inapplicable.8 9 Attempts to disguise the living arrangement as anything
other than blatant concubinage saved the parties from this prohibition. Thus, even
where the concubinage was disguised as a marital arrangement, the concubinage
was not deemed open.'
The proper remedy for donations which did fall under the limitation was to
nullify any donations of immovables9' and to reduce the donations of movables
to one-tenth of the estate.92 The treatment of illegitimate children by the Civil
Code of 1870 greatly resembled Roman law on the subject. Children were
classified as either legitimate, illegitimate, or legitimated.93 Legitimates were
those born during a marriage. 94 Illegitimates were those born out of marriage;9"
illegitimates were further sub-classified, as in Roman law, according to the degree
of guilt of their parents with regard to the children's conception. The more favored
were those "born from two persons, who, at the moment when such children were
conceived might have legally contracted marriage with each other."'" The less
favored were those who were "born from persons to whose marriage there existed
at the time some legal impediment. 97 Included within this inferior category were
adulterous" and incestuous bastards. 9
89. Jones v. Kyle, 168 La. 728, 123 So. 306 (1929).
90. Succession of Lannes, 187 La. 17, 22, 174 So. 94, 102 (1936); Miller v. LaFrance, 359 So.
2d 328 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ denied, 362 So. 2d 580 (1978).
91. Succession of Battiste, 145 So. 2d 668, 669 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1962). See also Hammon
v. Sentell, 160 La. 589, 107 So. 437 (1926).
92. See Succession of Payne v. Pigott, 459 So. 2d 1231 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1984); Succession
of Landry, 114 La. 829, 38 So. 575 (1905); Succession of Moore, 232 La. 556, 94 So. 2d 666(1957); Succession of Glynn, 167 So. 2d 533 (La. App. 4th Cir.), writ. ref., 168 So. 2d 823 (1964).93. La. Civ. Code art. 178 (1870), amended by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 1. Before its
amendment in 1979, Article 178 of the Code of 1870 provided that, "[c]hildren are either legitimate,
illegitimate, or legitimated."
94. La. Civ. Code art. 179 (1870), amended by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 1.
The original version of Article 179 provided that "[l]egitimate children are those who are born
during the marriage."
95. La. Civ. Code art. 180 (1870), amended by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 1.
Before its amendment, Article 180 stated that, "[illlegitimate children are those who are conceived
and born out of marriage. Illegitimate children may be legitimated in certain cases in the mannerprescribed by law."
96. La. Civ. Code art. 181 (1870), amended by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 1.
Before its amendment, Article 181 provided that "(t]here are two sorts of illegitimate children:
Those who are born from two persons, who, at the moment when such children were conceived mighthave legally contracted marriage with each other; and those who are born from persons to whose
marriage there existed at the time some legal impediment."
97. Id.
98. La. Civ. Code art. 182 (1870), repealed by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 4.
Before it was repealed, Article 182, entitled "Adulterous Bastards," provided that "[a]dulterous
bastards are those produced by an unlawful connection between two persons, who, at the time when
the child was conceived, were, either of them or both, connected by marriage with some other
person.
99. La. Civ. Code art. 183 (1870), repealed by 1979 La. Acts. No. 607, § 4.1
Before it was repealed, Article 183, entitled "Incestuous Bastards," provided that "[ilncestuous
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Those children whose parents were able to contract a marriage at the time
of the child's conception had the further possibility of being acknowledged by
their father and becoming "natural children." Those whose parents were
incapable of marrying at the time of conception were deemed bastards."W The
Code of 1870 specifically provided for a procedure for formally acknowledging
eligible children.' A parent could appear before a notary public in the
presence of two witnesses and execute a declaration of acknowledgment or the
parent could register the child as such on birth or baptismal records.
0 2 An
informal acknowledgment was later recognized by the cases'
0 3 and involved a
parent treating the child as his own by such outward manifestations as supporting
the child and allowing the child to be recognized by the community as the
parent's. These "natural children" were analogous to the liberi naturales born
of concubinage in Roman times. They were the favored illegitimates and were
able to claim support from their mother"° and were able to succeed to their
natural mother to the exclusion of all others as long as the mother had no
legitimate children or descendants.' Although they were granted a right to
bastards are those who are produced by the illegal connection of two persons who are relations within
the degree prohibited by law."
100. La. Civ. Code art. 202 (1870), repealed by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 4.
Before it was repealed, Article 202 provided:
Illegitimate children who have been acknowledged by their father, are called natural
children; those who have not been acknowledged by their father, or whose father and
mother were incapable of contracting marriage at the time of conception, or whose father
is unknown, are contradistinguished by the appellation of bastards.
101. See Leonard Oppenheim, Acknowledgment And Legitimation in Louisiana-Louisiana Act
50 of 1944, 19 Tul. L. Rev. 325, 328 (1945). Professor Leonard Oppenheim defined
acknowledgment "as a conscious effort on the part of the parent or parents to raise the status of the
child." Id.
102. La. Civ. Code art. 203 (1870), amended by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § I.
Before it was amended by the legislature in 1979, Article 203 provided:
The acknowledgment of an illegitimate child shall be made by a declaration executed
before a notary public, in presence of two witnesses, by the father and mother or either
of them, whenever it shall not have been made in the registering of the birth or baptism
of such child.
103. See Minor v. Young, 149 La. 583, 89 So. 757 (1921); Taylor v. Allen, 151 La. 82, 91 So.
635 (1921).
104. La. Civ. Code art. 240. Article 240 is still in the Code today, although constitutional
interpretations have modified its applicability, as well as the applicability of other articles which still
remain in Book I, Title VII, Section 2, "Of the Duties of Parents Toward Their Illegitimate Children,
and of the Duties of Illegitimate Children Toward Their Parents." It provides that "[flathers and
mothers owe alimony to their illegitimate children, when they are in need; Illegitimate children owe
likewise alimony to their father and mother, if they are in need, and if they themselves have the
means of providing it." Id.
105. La. Civ. Code art. 918 (1870), amended by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § I, repealed by 1981
La. Acts No. 919, § i. Legislative Act No. 919, § I of 1981 revised, amended, and reenacted the
Preliminary Title and chapters 1, 2, and 3 of Book III of the 1870 Civil Code.
Before it was amended in 1979, Article 918 provided:
Natural children are called to the legal succession of their natural mother, when they have
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support when in need from their father'0" and his heirs after his death, 07
their succession rights to their father were limited in that they could only inherit
from the father if no legitimate descendants, ascendants, collaterals nor a wife
survived the father.' Additionally, as was true of all illegitimate children,
they were not deemed to be subject to paternal authority, the Louisiana analogy
to the Roman potestas.'9
An advantage afforded natural children, which was not available to adulterous
or incestuous children, was the possibility of receiving donations inter vivos and
mortis causa. A mother could leave her entire estate to her natural children,
provided she was not survived by any legitimate descendants." However,
been duly acknowledged by her, if she has left no lawful children or descendants, to the
exclusion of her father and mother and other ascendants or collaterals of lawful kindred.
In case the natural mother has lawful children or descendants, the rights of the natural
child are reduced to a moderate alimony, which is determined by the rules established in
the title: Of Father and Child.
106. La. Civ. Code art. 240. For the text of Article 240, see supra note 104 and accompanying
text.
107. La. Civ. Code art. 241. The version of Article 241 enacted in 1870 is still in the Code
today. See supra note 104. Article 241 provides: "[i]llegitimate children have a right to claim this
alimony, not only from their father and mother, but even from their heirs after their death."
108. La. Civ. Code art. 919 (1870), amended by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 1, repealed by 1981
La. Acts No. 919, § 1.
Before it was repealed, Article 919 provided:
Natural children are called to the inheritance of their natural father, who has duly
acknowledged them, when he has left no descendants nor ascendants, nor collateral
relations, nor surviving wife, and to the exclusion only of the State.
In all other cases, they can only bring an action against their natural father or his heirs for
alimony, the amount of which shall be determined, as is directed in the title: Of Father
and Child.
109. La. Civ. Code art. 238. Article 238 provides, "[i]llegitimate children generally speaking,
belong to no family, and have no relations; accordingly they are not submitted to the paternal
authority, even when they have been legally acknowledged." See supra note 104.
110. La. Civ. Code art. 1484 (1870), amended by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 1.
Article 1484, as it appeared in the Code of 1870, provided that "(w]hen the natural mother has not
left any legitimate children or descendants, natural children may acquire from her by donation inter
vivos or mortis causa, to the whole amount of her succession."
Article 1484, amended by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 1, repealed by 1995 La. Acts No 1180, 4 3,
provided:
When the mother has left legitimatechildren or descendants, or when the father has left
legitimate children or descendants or father or mother, illegitimate children may only
acquire from the parent to the disposable portion of the succession.
When the mother has not left any legitimate children or descendants, or when the father
has not left any legitimate children or descendants or father or mother, illegitimate
children may acquire from the parent by donation inter vivos or mortis causa, to the
whole amount of the succession.
Although there was an attempt to repeal Article 1484 by 1990 La. Acts No. 147, § 3, the Louisiana
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional, in its entirety, Act 147 which contained a redefinition of
forced heirship. See Succession of Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993); Succession of Terry, 624 So.
2d 1201 (La. 1993). 1995 La. Acts No. 1180, § 3 provided for the repeal of Article 1484. However,
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natural children were not forced heirs and could not claim more than a mere
alimony if the mother chose to leave her property to others."' If a natural father
was not survived by any legitimate descendants, he could leave up to one-fourth of
his property to his natural children if he were survived by only legitimate
ascendants or brothers or sisters or their descendants. He could leave his natural
children up to one-third if he left only more remote collaterals."' If the father did
donate the maximum allowable amount to his natural children, he was required to
give the rest of his property to his legitimate relations."3 In contrast, natural
fathers and mothers were prohibited from giving more than a mere sustenance, or
enough to pocure an occupation orprofession, to their adulterous or incestuous child=n.""
§ 5 of Act 1180 provided that the Act was to become effective on January 1, 1996, "but only if the
proposed amendment of Article XII, Section 5 of the Constitution of Louisiana contained in the Act
which originated as House Bill No. 9 or Senate Bill No. 43 of this 1995 Regular Session of the
Legislature is adopted at the gubernatorial primary election to be held in 1995 and becomes
effective." The proposed amendment was adopted.
11. La. Civ. Code art. 1485 (1870), amended by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 1.
Article 1485, as it appeared in the Code of 1870, provided:
But if she left them only a part, and has disposed of the rest in favor of other persons, her
natural children have no action against her heirs for any thing more than so much as is
wanting to supply the maintenance that is secured to them by law in case what she has
left them be not sufficient for their support.
Article 1485, amended by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 1, repealed by 1995 La. Acts. No. 1180. §
3, provided:
When a parent has left to illegitimate children only a part of the succession and has
disposed of the rest in favor of other persons, the illegitimate children have no action
against the succession for anything more than so much as is wanting to supply the
maintenance that is secured to them by law, in case what has been left to them is not
sufficient for their support.
As with Article 1484, there was an attempt to repeal Article 1485 by 1990 La. Acts No. 147, §
3. For the validity of this repeal, see supra note 110. Similarly, 1995 La. Acts No. 1180 § 3
provided for the repeal of Article 1485, contingent on the passage of the proposed amendment to
Article XII, § 5 of the Louisiana Constitution protecting forced heirship.
112. La. Civ. Code art. 1486 (1972), repealed by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 4.
Before it was repealed, Article 1486 provided:
When the natural father has not left legitimate children or descendants, the natural child
or children acknowledged by him may receive from him, by donation inter vivos or mortis
causa to the amount of the following proportions, to wit:
One-fourth of his property, if he leaves legitimate ascendants or legitimate brothers or
sisters or descendants from such brothers and sisters; and one-third, if he leaves only more
remote collateral relations.
113. La. Civ. Code art. 1487 (1972), repealed by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 4.
Before it was repealed, Article 1487 provided:
In all cases in which the father disposes, in favor of his natural children, of the portion
permitted him by law to dispose of, he is bound to dispose of the rest of his property in
favor of his legitimate relations; every other disposition shall be null, except those which
he may make in favor of some public institution.
114. La. Civ. Code art. 1488 (1972), repealed by 1978 La. Acts No. 362, § I.
Before it was repealed, Article 1988 provided that "(n]atural fathers 'and mothers can, in no case,
dispose of property in favor of their adulterine or incestuous children, unless to the mere amount of
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Bastards included children whose parents could have acknowledged them but
never did, as well as the adulterous and incestuous children who were deprived of
the possibility of acknowledgment. All such children were able to claim alimony
from their mothers and her descendants.'
Similar to the Roman system, the Louisiana system provided methods oflegitimation which would elevate the child to the status of a legitimate child.
Originally, legitimation by subsequent marriage, as in Justinian's time, was limited
to only those children whose parents were capable of contracting marriage at the
time of the children's conception. Thus, as it was also in the Code Napoleon," 6
incestuous and adulterous children were not eligible for legitimation by subsequent
marriage of the parents."' A 1948 amendment to the Louisiana Civil Code of1870 liberalized the article, affording this possibility to adulterous children."'
In addition to mandating marriage by the parents, the original provision in the
Code of 1870 required that the parents legally acknowledge the children, "either
before their marriage by an act passed before a notary and two witnesses, or by
their contract of marriage itself." This was amended in 1944 to allow br
legitimation by subsequent marriage of the parents when the parents had "formally
or informally acknowledged them for their children either before or after the
marriage."" 9  It was deemed necessary to make that change in order to afford
what is necessary to their sustenance, or to procure them an occupation or profession by which to
support themselves."
115. La. Civ. Code art. 245 (1870), repealed by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 4. Before its rep4e.alin 1979, Article 245 provided that, "[a]limony is due to bastards, though they be adulterous and
incestuous, by the mother and her ascendants."
116. Code Napoleon art. 331. Article 331 provided:
Children born out of marriage except those who are born from an incestuous or
adulterous connection, may be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their father and
mother, whenever the latter have legally acknowledged them for their children, either
before their marriage or in the act of celebration itself.
Id. (emphasis added).
117. La. Civ. Code art. 198 (1870), amended and reenacted by 1944 La. Acts No. 50; 1948 La.Acts No. 482, § 1; 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 1. Before its first amendment in 1944, Article 198
provided:
Children born out of marriage, except those who are born from an incestuous or
adulterous connection, may be legitimated by the subsequent marriage of their father and
mother, whenever, the latter have legally acknowledged them for their children, eitherbefore their marriage by an act passed before a notary and two witnesses, or by their
contract of marriage itself.
La. Civ. Code art. 198 (1870) (emphasis added). Article 198 was further amended in 1979. For thetext of the current version of Article 198 following its third amendment in 1979, see infra note 154
and accompanying text.
118. La. Civ. Code art. 198 (1870), amended and reenacted by 1944 La. Acts No. 50; 1948 La.
Acts No. 482, § 1. After the 1948 revision, Article 198 provided that "(c]hildren born out of
marriage, except those who are born from an incestuous connection, are legitimated by the subsequent
marriage of their father and mother, whenever the latter have formally or informally acknowledged
them for their children, either before or after the marriage."
119. See 1944 La. Acts No. 50, amending and reenacting La. Civ. Code art. 198 (1870).
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children who had been informally acknowledged to be legitimated by the marriage
of their parents and also to provide a mechanism for legitimation of a natural child
in cases in which the parent married without legitimating the child and later had
legitimate children. 20 This was a concern since the second form of legitimation,
which bears some resemblance to the Roman legitimation by imperial rescript was,
as the Roman procedure, only afforded to fathers who had no legitimate ascendants
or descendants.'' This second process of legitimation by notarial act was also
limited to children'whose parents could have contracted marriage at the time of
conception. Further amendment to the Code in 1972 allowed for the possibility of
adulterous bastards to be legitimated if the impediment to the marriage of the
parents was removed by the time of the execution of the notarial act of
legitimation."
Few remnants remain of the laws of concubinage and illegitimate children in
Louisiana. The restriction on donations to concubines is no longer a part of
Louisiana law. In 1979, more than likely prompted by the interesting case of
Succession of Bacot,123 the Louisiana legislature repealed Article 1481 of the
Civil Code of 1870."' In Bacot, the sole legatee of the testator's will was his
alleged homosexual lover with whom he had lived in a long-term relationship. The
120. See generally Harriet S. Daggett, Suggestions for the Consideration of the Council of the
Louisiana State Law Institute, 5 La. L. Rev. 377 (1943).
121. La. Civ Code art. 200 (1870), amended by 1972 La. Acts. No. 391, § 1; 1979 La. Acts. No.
607, § 1; 1983 La. Acts No. 480, § 1.
Before it was amended, Article 200 provided:
A natural father or mother shall have the power to legitimate his or her natural children
by an act passed before a notary and two witnesses, declaring that it is the intention of
the parent making the declaration to legitimate such child or children. But only those
natural children can be legitimated who are the offspring of parents who, at the time of
conception, could have contracted marriage. Nor can a parent legitimate his or her natural
offspring in the manner prescribed in this article, when there exists on the part of such
parent legitimate ascendants or descendants.
122. See 1972 La. Acts No. 391, § 1, amending La. Civ. Code art. 200 (1870). As amended in
1972, Article 200 provided:
A natural farther or mother shall have the power to legitimate his or her natural children
by an act passed before a notary and two witnesses, declaring that it is the intention of
the parent making the declaration to legitimate such child or children; provided, there
exists at the time of the conception or at the time of the legitimation of such children no
legal impediment to the marriage of the natural father and natural mother. Nor can a
parent legitimate his or her natural offspring in the manner prescribed in this article, when
there exists on the part of such parent legitimate descendants at the time of the
legitimation.
123. 502 So. 2d 1118 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1987).
124. La. Civ. Code art. 1481 (1870), repealed by 1987 La. Acts No. 468, § 1.
Before it was repealed, Article 1481 provided:
Those who have lived together in open concubinage are respectively incapable of making
to each other, whether inter vivos or mortis causa, any donation of immovables; and if
they make a donation of movables, it can not exceed one-tenth part of the whole value
of their estate.
Those who afterwards marry are excepted from this rle.
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decedent had one forced heir, an adult male whom he had adopted almost three
years prior to his death. The trial court reduced the legatee's portion to one-tenth
of the testator's estate, payable only in movables on the rationale that the decedent
had lived in open concubinage with the legatee. 25
On appeal, the Louisiana Fourth Circuit disagreed with the trial court,
reasoning that Article 1481 limiting donations between persons who lived in open
concubinage could not apply in a same-sex relationship. 26  Although
concubinage was not defined in the Code, the court observed that it has
"traditionally been viewed as a union between a man and a woman, living together
as husband and wife but outside of marriage."' 27 Additionally, the article
exempts those who later marry from the restrictions. Because "[t]here is not now,
nor has there ever been in our law a legal mechanism for recognizing marriage
between persons of the same sex,"'28 such persons could not marry and could not
therefore be concubines. Thus, the provisions of Article 1481 were inapplicable.
The repeal of Article 1481 followed shortly after the Bacot decision."29 Thus, as
the Romans limited gifts between concubines so as not to favor their position over
that of married persons who were not free to donate to each other, the Louisiana
legislature now permits gifts between those living in concubinage so as not to
disfavor them over partners in same-sex unions who are free to donate to each
other.
Another area in which Louisiana currently analogizes concubinage to marriage
relates to the payment of alimony after divorce. The obligation to support a needy
ex-spouse ceases when that ex-spouse remarries 30 In 1982,' the legislature
expanded that concept relieving the payor from any obligation to support an ex-
spouse who lived in "open concubinage." "Open concubinage" in the alimony
article has been interpreted to mean the same as "open concubinage" meant in
previous Article 1481 relating to donations.'32
125. Bacot, 502 So. 2d at 1121.
126. Id. at 1129-30.
127. Id. at 1128.
128. Id. at 1130. In 1987, the Louisiana legislature specifically defined marriage as "a legal
relationship between a man and a woman." La. Civ. Code art. 86, enacted by 1987 La. Acts No.
886, § 1.
129. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
130. La. Civ. Code an. 160 (1870), amended by 1982 La. Acts No. 580, § 1, redesignated as
La. Civ. Code art. 112 by 1990 La. Acts No. 1008, § 8 and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10.
Article 112 provides in pertinent part that "[p]ermanent periodic alimony shall be revoked if it
becomes unnecessary and terminates if the spouse to whom it has been awarded remarries or enters
into open concubinage." La. Civ. Code art. 112 (emphasis added).
131. La. Civ. Code art. 160 (1870), amended by 1982 La. Acts No. 580, § 1, and 1986 La. Acts
No. 229, § 1. Article 160 was redesignated as La. Civ. Code art. 112 by 1990 La. Acts No. 10011,
§ 8 and 1990 La. Acts No. 1009, § 10. Thus, the substance of Article 160 of the Code of 1870 has
been amended and appears today as Article 112. For the text of Article 112, see supra note 130 and
accompanying text.
132. Thomas v. Thomas, 440 So. 2d 879, 883-84 (La. App. 2d Cir.), cert denied, 443 So. 2d 597
(1983).
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Distinctions among illegitimate children who have timely proved their
filiation no longer exist in the Louisiana Civil Code. The tide began to turn for
illegitimates in 1968 with the landmark case of Levy v. Louisiana.' In that
case, the United States Supreme Court recognized the right of five illegitimate
children to recover wrongful death benefits on the death of their mother. Using
an equal protection analysis, the Court found no rational basis for treating
illegitimate children different from legitimate children in such a situation. 3
Yet, shortly thereafter in 1971 in the case of Labine v. Vincent,'3s the United
States Supreme Court distinguished the area of succession law in upholding the
constitutionality of Article 919 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, which
allowed natural children to inherit from their intestate father only if he had other
surviving relatives or wife.'36
In the years that followed, the United States Supreme Court entertained
many challenges to state statutes which distinguished illegitimate children from
other children. One by one, areas of distinction were eliminated.' As to
workmen's compensation benefits, 3 Social Security benefits, 39 support form
a natural father,'" welfare benefits,"' and disability benefits relating to a
disabled parent,"2 the United States Supreme Court recognized rights of
illegitimate children.
In 1976, although not labelling illegitimate children as a "suspect class"
requiring strict scrutiny of any statute discriminating against them, the United
States Supreme Court afforded illegitimate children a middle level of scrutiny,
above mere rational basis. Stating that the scrutiny required must not be
"toothless," the Court in Mathews v. Lucas"13 provided the new test to be
applied when analyzing the rights of illegitimate children.
Another challenge to intestate succession laws followed. In 1977, in the
pivotal case of Trimble v. Gordon,'" the United States Supreme Court declared
a portion of the Illinois Probate Act unconstitutional as a denial of equal
protection to illegitimate children who were not included as heirs of their
133. 391 U.S. 68, 88 S. Ct. 1509, reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 898, 89 S. Ct. 65 (1968).
134. Id. at 72, 88 S. Ct. at 1511.
135. 401 U.S. 532,91 S. Ct. 1017, rehg denied, 402 U.S. 990,91 S. Ct. 1672 (1971).
136. Id. at 539, 91 S. Ct. at 1021.
137. See generally Frederick Swaim and Kathryn Venturatos Loro, Successions and Donations
§ 3.1-3.7, in 10 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1995) (providing a detailed explanation of the status
of illegitimate children in Louisiana).
138. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 92 S. Ct. 1400 (1972).
139. Richardson v. Davis, 409 U.S. 1069, 93 S. Ct. 678 (1972); Richardson v. Griffin, 409 U.S.
1069, 93 S. Ct. 689 (1972).
140. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 93 S. Ct. 872 (1973).
141. New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 93 S. C. 1700 (1973).
142. Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628, 94 S. Ct. 2496, appeal after remand, 523 F.2d 689
(7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912, 96 S. Ct. 3200 (1976).
143. 427 U.S. 495, 96 S. Ct. 2755 (1976).
144. 430 U.S. 762, 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977).
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intestate father. Applying the middle level of scrutiny outlined in Mathews, the
Court noted that it had examined the Illinois statute "more critically'" than
it had examined the Louisiana article in Labine.
The first area relating to successions and donations which was changed in
Louisiana was the code article prohibiting natural parents from donating to their
adulterous or incestuous children. In Succession of Robins,'" the Louisiana
Supreme Court held Article 1488 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 to be
violative of the equal protection clause of the Louisiana Constitution of
1974. 47 The Louisiana legislature repealed the article the following year."'
The prohibition of donations by parents to illegitimate children when legitimate
children existed was successfully challenged the very next year."9
In 1979, the Louisiana legislature repealed the articles restricting donations
by a father to his natural children.'5° It recognized the right of a mother to
leave her natural children up to the disposable portion of her estate if she were
survived by legitimate descendants.' The classifications of bastards according
to the guilt of their parents in conceiving them was eliminated. 2  All
references to "natural children" were changed to the new term "acknowledged
illegitimates."
The major case eliminating distinctions of illegitimate children as to
inheritance was the Succession of Brown's3 in which the Louisiana Supreme
Court re-examined Article 919 of the Civil Code of 1870 which had been upheld
in Labine. Using a higher standard of scrutiny, the court analyzed the code
article in terms of the equal protection clause of both the United States and
Louisiana Constitutions, finding the article violative of both.
Finally, the legislation of 1981 removed distinctions between legitimate
children and illegitimate children as to inheritance rights, including the right to
claim a forced portion in the parent's estate. Today any child may be
145. Trimble, 430 U.S. at 776 n.17, 97 S. Ct. at 1468 n.17.
146. 349 So. 2d 276 (La. 1977).
147. Id. at 280. See also La. Const. art. 1, § 3, which provides in pertinent part:
No person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws. No law shall discriminate
against a person because of race or religious beliefs, or affiliations. No law shall
arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably discriminate against a person because of birth,
age, sex, culture, physical condition, or political ideas or affiliations.
148. 1978 La. Acts No. 362, § 1.
149. Succession of Thompson, 367 So. 2d 796 (La. 1979).
150. La. Civ. Code art. 1486 (1870), repealed by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 4; La. Civ. Code art.1487 (1870), repealed by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 4. For the text of Articles 1486 and 1487. see
supra notes 112 and 113 and accompanying text.
151. La. Civ. Code art. 1484 (1870), amended by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 1, repealed by 1995La. Acts No. 1180, § 3. For the text of Article 1484 both before and after the 1979 amendment, andfor the status of Article 1484 following the Louisiana Supreme Court's decision in Succession of
Lauga, 624 So. 2d 1156 (La. 1993), see supra note 110 and accompanying text.
152. La. Civ. Code art. 202 (1870), repealed by 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 4. For the text of
Article 202 before it was repealed in 1979, see supra note 100 and accompanying text.
153. 388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 998, 101 S. Ct. 1703 (1981).
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legitimated"3 4 or formally acknowledged,' regardless of the circumstances
of his birth or conception. The difference between formal acknowledgment and
legitimation as to inheritance rights has been blurred since they each afford the
child essentially the same rights. Informal acknowledgment alone is now
insufficient for a child to claim rights. Informal acknowledgment may be
submitted, however, as proof of filiation. An illegitimate child who has not been
formally acknowledged has the right to bring a filiation proceeding to establish
his relationship to the parent. The action must be brought within one year of the
parent's death or nineteen years of the child's birth whichever comes first.
5 6
Although the laws of Rome and Louisiana concerning the "other" family
were strikingly similar for most of Louisiana's history, today little similarity
remains. As the concept of family changes daily and as constitutional mandates
prohibit distinctions among children, the "other" family, the one of concubines
and natural children, is no longer a distinct entity subject to clearly defined rules
reminiscent of a bygone era.
154. See La. Civ. Code art. 198 (1870), amended by 1944 La. Acts No. 50; 1948 La. Acts No.
482, § 1; 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 1. See also La. Civ. Code art. 200 (1870), amended by 1972 La.
Acts No. 391, § 1; 1979 La. Acts No. 607, § 1; 1983 La. Acts No. 480, § 1.
The current version of Article 198 provides "[i]llegitimate children are legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of their father and mother, whenever the latter have formally or informally
acknowledged them as their children, either before or after the marriage."
Article 200 provides that "[a] father or mother shall have the power to legitimate his or her
illegitimate children by an act passed before a notary and two witnesses, declaring that it is the
intention of the parent making the declaration to legitimate such child or children.".
155. La. Civ. Code art. 203:
The acknowledgment of an illegitimate child shall be made by a declaration executed
before a notary public, in the presence of two witnesses, by the father and mother or
either of them, or it may be made in the registering of the birth or baptism of such child.
156. La. Civ. Code art. 209(C). Article 209 provides:
The proceeding required by this article must be brought within one year of the death of
the alleged parent or within nineteen years of the child's birth, whichever first occurs,
This time limitation shall run against all persons, including minors and interdicts. If the
proceeding is not timely instituted, the child may not thereafter establish his filiation,
except for the sole purpose of establishing the right to recover damages under Article
2315. A proceeding for that purpose may be brought within one year of the death of the
alleged parent and may be cumulated with the action to recover damages.
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